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Bernard Berofsky, Nature’s Challenge to Free Will
William Simkulet, University of Kansas
In the free-will debate there are two kinds of compatibilists – those
resigned to the impossibility of genuine free will but who articulate some
cache of compatibilist freedoms or advocate some form of libertarian
fictionalism, and those who believe that genuine free will is compatible
with determinism and take the free-will problem to be why others do not
see it this way. Bernard Berofsky is of the latter kind.The goal of the book
is to defend Humean compatibilism from incompatibilist concerns.
Berofsky sees opposition to compatibilism as arising from the conflation
of determinism and necessitarianism. He says “Freedom is compatible with
determinism because the only reason to believe otherwise is based on the
false metaphysics of necessitarianism” (p. 3). Hume, Berofsky says, believed we
had no reason to believe that necessary connections exist in nature; rather,
we are merely psychologically inclined to infer necessary connections from
the regular conjunction of events.When we subtract our subjective expec-
tation, all we are left with are pairs of events that happen to occur together.
By rejecting necessitarianism, Berofsky has apparently staked a position
between the “necessitarian” determinist position that the actual past neces-
sitates only one possible future, and the indeterminist position that the
actual past is compatible with the existence of multiple possible futures.
For Berofsky the actual past coexists with only one possible future,
without necessitating that possible future. This is new ground in the
free-will debate, but unfortunately it provides a rather shaky foundation
for Berofsky’s defence of compatibilism. First, it is not clear that Berofsky’s
middle ground counts as a deterministic metaphysical theory; if not blatant
indeterminism, his position seems to be that the world can be wholly
causally determined without being causally necessitated, where determin-
ism just is constant conjunction. It is not clear that this view is a
determinist view at all; it seems to be a description of our experiential data
rather than a theory about how the world is.
Second, much as we are unjustifiably psychologically inclined to believe
that there is a necessary connection between constantly conjoined events,
we are psychologically inclined to believe that the past will be like the
future. Berofsky contends that causal laws are to be understood as state-
ments of regular association of events, but all we can know, by his
reasoning, is that causal laws are statements of regular association of events
in the past – we are not justified to believe that these regular associations
will persist in the future. If this is the case, Berofsky cannot help himself
to the conclusion that there is only one possible future.
This trouble stems from a misreading of what Berofsky calls Hume’s
antinecessitarian position. Hume argues that we never have any direct
experience of a necessary connection between two events, and from this
Berofsky concludes that causal necessity is impossible. More troubling, for
Hume the alternative to necessity is chance, which is inconsistent with a
wholly deterministic worldview.To defend Humean compatibilism, Berof-
sky must show that free will is consistent with determinism regardless of
whether our beliefs about a deterministic, necessitarian world are justified.
Berofsky believes that his rejection of necessitarianism plays a key role
in his metaphysics, contending that by doing so we can understand
ourselves as playing a creative role in our own actions. “Through our
decision making activity, we in part determine the very laws by which our
decisions are governed,” he contends (p. 5).
There is little discussion of moral responsibility in this book, by design.
Berofsky contends that the problem of the apparent incompatibility of
moral responsibility with determinism is very different from the problem
of the apparent incompatibility of free will and determinism. He claims
that “the heart of the traditional problem of free will and determinism is
ascertaining just how limiting to the agent is a deterministic world” (p. 6).
The problem with this approach is that the concept of free will is best
understood by the role it plays in moral responsibility – Berofsky con-
structs his account of free will indifferent to this role, and his account is
uncontroversially inconsistent with true moral responsibility as a result.
This schism is well illustrated in Berofsky’s defence of compatibilism
against what he calls the incompatibilist demand for self-creation. He
characterises the incompatibilist “complaint” like so “If my decision is
determined, I am not its real author; and if I am not its real author, I have
forgone the opportunity to take responsibility for what I become, for the
values I live by. . . . If I am ultimately responsible for my nature and my
values, I can take credit or blame for the results and that is what makes me
fully human” (p. 46). Berofsky identifies this concern as a threat posed by
determinism to one’s self-worth. He responds that, in a deterministic
world, agents still play a role in determining their actions (even if their
doing so is itself determined), that they can still take responsibility for their
decisions and that these decisions reflect the agent who makes them.
Berofsky admits that the incompatibilist will be dissatisfied with this
response, but it strikes me that the incompatibilist has made two substan-
tial points that Berofsky misses. The first point turns on the apparent
incompatibility of moral responsibility with determinism – if our actions
are determined by circumstances outside of our control, in what sense, the
incompatibilist worries, can we be held morally responsible for them?
Anyone can take responsibility for anything, but actually deserving blame
or credit is quite different.
The second point turns on a notion the compatibilist already accepts –
that there is a substantive difference between self-determination and being
causally determined by external sources such as coercion, hypnosis and the
like.The incompatibilist worry is that what the compatibilist calls free will
is type-identical with the prima facie undesirable external deterministic
processes.
Berofsky characterises the incompatibilist’s notion of ultimate control
as being in the position of one who has the power to choose from options
that cannot be ranked, and concludes that nothing is gained by this power.
This characterisation of ultimate control is a mistake.
First, this characterisation ignores the Buridan’s ass paradox – a donkey
equidistant from two sources of food who ranks them identically would
apparently starve, if not for the ability to choose arbitrarily between these
equally ranked options in the very way that Berofsky claims is worthless.
Of course, this kind of control would not satisfy the incompatibilist – but
clearly something is gained by possessing it.
Second, it is uncontroversially true that the ultimate control in question
is the ability to be able to non-arbitrarily choose which reasons one acts
upon. Much as we are psychologically inclined to infer necessity from
constant conjunction, it seems that we are inclined to infer this kind of
ultimate control over our actions from our experiences. Even if this notion
of ultimate control is incoherent, it is uncontroversially preferable to
determinism, as the undetermined agent has all of the options as the
determined one and more. The only conceivable picture of ultimate
control that would be less preferable to determinism is one in which
actions were wholly determined at random – if all free actions are made
with the same inattention to reason as the donkey’s choosing to go left
over right. This is how Hume characterised the concept of liberty, but it
is clearly not what the incompatibilist desires or what Berofsky spurns.
Finally, this kind of control is said to be a prerequisite for true moral
responsibility – for being responsible for one’s actions. Berofsky’s account
of free will is prima facie inconsistent with such responsibility; rather, he
sketches a view rather similar to that of Robert Kane, where one’s taking
responsibility for one’s actions is not justified morally. Instead, as with
Kane, one is said to have free will if one is causally determined to embrace
one’s beliefs and character traits as one’s own. Berofsky’s view differs from
Kane, largely, in so far as Kane required at least one undetermined action
to occur for the agent to self-identify with, while Berofsky is content that
the agent be wholly determined.
In the final chapters of this book, Berofsky offers a rigorous treatment
of what can be called a non-necessitarian determinist account of causal
laws, arguing that determined agents can play a substantive role in deter-
mining the causal laws that govern them, rather than being determined by
them.This role, I think, fails to live up to what the incompatibilist believes
is necessary for moral responsibility, but helps to draw a distinction
between the necessitarian position he refutes and his own determinist
position. This distinction, I believe, represents this book’s greatest contri-
bution to the free-will debate, but I fear this distinction is every bit as
incoherent as the incompatibilist position is often made out to be.
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